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Abstract
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley
and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik. Recently, Eriksson and Karlander introduced a hybrid model, which was
further generalized by Sotomayor. In this paper, we propose a common generalization of these models by utilizing the framework
of discrete convex analysis introduced by Murota, and verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in our general model.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models: (i) the marriage model due to Gale
and Shapley [11] and (ii) the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [28]. The former does not allow money
or transferable utilities, whereas the latter does (see [26]). Our goal is to propose a common generalization of these
models, and to verify the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome1 in our model. Our model includes several well
known special cases as shown in Fig. 1.
In the marriage model there are sets of men and women of the same size, and each person has a strict preference order
on persons of the opposite gender. A matching is a set of disjoint man–woman pairs. Gale and Shapley [11] introduced
the concept of pairwise-stability2 of a matching, and gave a constructive proof of the existence of such a matching.
Since Gale and Shapley’s paper a large number of variations and extensions have been proposed, and algorithmic
progress has also been made (see, e.g., [13,2]). Recently, Fleiner [7] extended the marriage model to the framework
 This work is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of
Japan.
E-mail addresses: fujishig@kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp (S. Fujishige), aki-tamura@math.keio.ac.jp (A. Tamura).
1 Several concepts of stability such as pairwise-stability, corewise-stability, and setwise-stability have been discussed for the marriage and
assignment models, and their extensions. This paper concentrates on the most elementary concept, pairwise-stability.
2 In the marriage model the three concepts of pairwise-stability, corewise-stability, and setwise-stability are equivalent.
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Fig. 1. Hierarchy of two-sided matching market models: an arrow from model A to model B means that B is a generalization of A.
of matroids, and showed the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome. The preference of each person in his model can
be described by a linear utility function on a matroidal domain. Eguchi and Fujishige [5] extended this formulation
to a more general one in terms of discrete convex analysis, which was developed by Murota [17,18,20] as a uniﬁed
framework in discrete optimization. In the Eguchi–Fujishige model, the preference of each agent is described by a
discrete concave function, called an M-concave function.3 The Eguchi–Fujishige model is also a concrete example
(in terms of utility functions) of the generalized models (in terms of choice functions with substitutability) by Roth
[24,25], Sotomayor [29],Alkan and Gale [1], and Fleiner [8], because anM-concave function deﬁnes a choice function
with substitutability (see Lemma 5.2).
In the other standard model, the assignment model, if a man and a woman form a partnership, then they obtain a total
proﬁt that may be divided into payoffs. An outcome consists of payoff vectors for men and women, and a matching.
Shapley and Shubik [28] showed that the core4 of this model is nonempty. Various extensions of this model have also
been proposed. Sotomayor [30] showed the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome in a many-to-many model in which
each agent is permitted to form multiple partnerships with agents of the opposite set without multiple partnerships of
each pair. Thompson [33] veriﬁed the nonemptiness of the core in a many-to-many model with heterogeneous agents,
in which multiple partnerships of each pair are allowed. Sotomayor [32] also proved the nonemptiness of the core for
a generalization of Thompson’s model.
Progress has also beenmade toward unifying the marriage model and the assignment model. Kaneko [14] formulated
a general model that includes both, and proved the nonemptiness of the core. Roth and Sotomayor [27] proposed a
general model that also encompasses both, and investigated the lattice property for payoffs in the core, though the
existence of a pairwise-stable outcome is not guaranteed in their model.
Our model is independent of the above two models by Kaneko [14] and Roth and Sotomayor [27]. It is motivated by
the model due to Eriksson and Karlander [6] and Sotomayor’s generalization [31]. In the Eriksson–Karlander model,
the set of agents is partitioned into two categories, one of “rigid” agents and the other of “ﬂexible” agents. Rigid agents
do not receive side payments, as in the marriagemodel, while ﬂexible agents do, as in the assignment model. Sotomayor
[31] investigated this hybrid model and gave a non-constructive proof of the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome.
3 The symbol  in M is read “natural.”
4 The three concepts of pairwise-stability, corewise-stability, and setwise-stability are equivalent in this model.
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We propose a common further generalization that preserves the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome. Our model
has the following features:
• the preference of agents on each side is expressed by a discrete concave utility function, called an M-concave
function,
• each agent is permitted to form partnerships with more than one agent on the opposite side,
• each pair is permitted to form multiple partnerships,
• the set of pairs is arbitrarily partitioned into a set of ﬂexible pairs and a set of rigid pairs.
An M-concave function has nice features as a utility function, as we shall discuss in the next section. Our main result
is that our model always has a pairwise-stable outcome. Corollaries are the existence of pairwise-stable outcomes in
the above-mentioned special cases of our models (see Fig. 1).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains M-concavity together with its properties and gives character-
izations of pairwise-stability of the marriage model and the assignment model in terms of utility functions. Section 3
describes our model based on discrete convex analysis. Section 4 shows that several existing models are special cases
of our model. Section 5 proposes an algorithm for ﬁnding a pairwise-stable outcome and prove its correctness, which
shows our main theorem.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. M-concavity
Let E be a nonempty ﬁnite set, and let Z and R be the sets of integers and reals, respectively. Let ZE be the set of
integral vectors x = (x(e) : e ∈ E). Also, let RE denote the set of real vectors indexed by E. For each x ∈ ZE , we
deﬁne its positive support supp+(x) and its negative support supp−(x) by
supp+(x) = {e ∈ E | x(e)> 0}, supp−(x) = {e ∈ E | x(e)< 0}.
For any x, y ∈ ZE , x ∧ y and x ∨ y are the vectors whose eth components (x ∧ y)(e) and (x ∨ y)(e) are, respectively,
min{x(e), y(e)} and max{x(e), y(e)} for all e ∈ E. For each S ⊆ E, we denote by S the characteristic vector of S,
deﬁned by S(e) = 1 if e ∈ S and S(e) = 0 otherwise. We simply write e instead of {e} for all e ∈ E, while we
denote by 0 the zero vector in ZE , where 0 /∈E. For a vector p ∈ RE and a function f : ZE → R∪ {−∞}, we deﬁne
functions 〈p, x〉 and f [+p](x) in x ∈ ZE by
〈p, x〉 =
∑
e∈E
p(e)x(e), f [+p](x) = f (x) + 〈p, x〉.
We also denote the set of maximizers of f on U ⊆ ZE and the effective domain of f by
arg max{f (y) | y ∈ U} = {x ∈ U |f (x)f (y) for all y ∈ U},
dom f = {x ∈ ZE |f (x)> − ∞}.
A function f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} with dom f 
= ∅ is called M-concave [20,21] if it satisﬁes5
(M) for any x, y ∈ dom f and any e ∈ supp+(x − y), there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x − y) ∪ {0} such that
f (x) + f (y)f (x − e + e′) + f (y + e − e′).
Here are two simple examples of M-concave functions.
Example 2.1. A set I of subsets of E is called the family of independent sets of a matroid on E if it satisﬁes the
following three conditions: (a) ∅ ∈ I, (b) if X ⊆ Y ∈ I then X ∈ I, and (c) for any X, Y ∈ I with |X|< |Y |, there
5 Condition (M) is denoted by (−M-EXC) in [20].
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exists e ∈ Y\X such that X ∪ {e} ∈ I, where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. For any familyI ⊆ 2E of independent
sets of a matroid and any w ∈ RE , the function f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} deﬁned by
f (x) =
{ ∑
e∈X
w(e) if x = X for some X ∈ I,
−∞ otherwise
for all x ∈ ZE is M-concave (see [20]).
Example 2.2. A nonempty familyT of subsets of E is called a laminar family if X ∩ Y = ∅, X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X holds
for all X, Y ∈T. For a laminar familyT and a family of univariate concave functions fX : R → R ∪ {−∞} indexed
by X ∈T, the function f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} deﬁned by
f (x) =
∑
X∈T
fX
(∑
e∈X
x(e)
)
for all x ∈ ZE is M-concave if dom f 
= ∅ (see [20]).
AnM-concave function has nice features as a utility function. Inmathematical economics, a utility function is usually
assumed to be concave. For any M-concave function f : ZE → R∪ {−∞}, there exists an ordinary concave function
f¯ : RE → R∪{−∞} such that f¯ (x)=f (x) for all x ∈ ZE [17]. That is, anyM-concave function onZE has a concave
extension on RE . An M-concave function f also satisﬁes submodularity [22]: f (x)+ f (y)f (x ∨ y)+ f (x ∧ y) for
all x, y ∈ dom f .
Next we consider natural generalizations of the gross substitutability and single improvement condition that were
originally proposed for set functions by Kelso and Crawford [15] and Gul and Stacchetti [12], respectively.
(GS) For any p, q ∈ RE and any x ∈ arg max f [−p] such that pq and arg max f [−q] 
= ∅, there exists
y ∈ arg max f [−q] such that y(e)x(e) for all e ∈ E with p(e) = q(e).
(SI) For any p ∈ RE and any x, y ∈ dom f with f [−p](x)<f [−p](y),
f [−p](x)< max
e∈supp+(x−y)∪{0}
max
e′∈supp−(x−y)∪{0}
f [−p](x − e + e′).
Here we assume that E denotes the set of indivisible commodities, p ∈ RE a price vector of commodities, x ∈ ZE a
consumption of commodities, and f (x) a monetary valuation for x. The above conditions are interpreted as follows.
Condition (GS) says that when each price increases or remains the same, the consumer wants a consumption such that
the numbers of the commodities whose prices remain the same do not decrease. Condition (SI) guarantees that the
consumer can bring consumption x nearer to any better consumption y by changing the consumption of at most two
commodities. The equivalence between gross substitutability and the single improvement condition for set functions
was ﬁrst pointed out by Gul and Stacchetti [12], and the equivalence between the single improvement condition and
M-concavity for set functions was by Fujishige andYang [10]. Murota and Tamura [23] showed that an M-concave
function satisﬁes (GS) and (SI), and conversely,M-concavity is characterized by (SI), and by a stronger version of (GS)
under a certain natural assumption. Danilov et al. [3] characterized M-concavity by another strengthened property of
(GS) under a natural assumption. M-concavity also implies substitutability (see Lemma 5.2).
2.2. The marriage model and the assignment model
In this subsection we characterize pairwise-stability in the marriage model and the assignment model in terms of
utility functions. These characterizations will be useful to understand pairwise-stability in our model.
Let M and W denote two disjoint sets of agents and E = M × W . Agents in M and W are interpreted as men and
women, respectively. To each pair (i, j) ∈ E, a pair (aij , bij ) ∈ R2 is associated. Here aij and bij are interpreted as
proﬁts of i and j in the assignment model. And they deﬁne preferences in the marriage model: man i ∈ M prefers j1
to j2 if aij1 >aij2 , and i is indifferent between j1 and j2 if aij1 = aij2 (similarly, the preferences of woman j ∈ W are
deﬁned by bij ’s). We assume that aij > 0 if j is acceptable to i, and aij = −∞ otherwise, and bij > 0 if i is acceptable
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to j, and bij = −∞ otherwise. Let {0, 1}E denote the set of all 0–1 vectors x on E, i.e., xij = 0 or 1 for all (i, j) ∈ E.
Deﬁne two aggregated utility functions fM for M and fW for W as follows: for all x ∈ ZE ,
fM(x) =
{ ∑
(i,j)∈E
aij xij if x ∈ {0, 1}E and ∑
j∈W
xij 1 for all i ∈ M,
−∞ otherwise,
(1)
fW(x) =
{ ∑
(i,j)∈E
bij xij if x ∈ {0, 1}E and ∑
i∈M
xij 1 for all j ∈ W,
−∞ otherwise.
(2)
As shown in Example 2.1, fM and fW are M-concave.
We now consider the marriage model. A matching is a subset of E such that every agent appears at most once. Given
a matching X, i ∈ M (resp. j ∈ W ) is called unmatched in X if there exists no j ∈ W (resp. i ∈ M) with (i, j) ∈ X. A
matching X is called pairwise-stable6 if there exist q ∈ RM and r ∈ RW such that
(m1) qi = aij > − ∞ and rj = bij > − ∞ for all (i, j) ∈ X,
(m2) qi = 0 (resp. rj = 0) if i (resp. j) is unmatched in X,
(m3) qiaij or rj bij for all (i, j) ∈ E.
The above-deﬁned pairwise-stability in the marriage model can also be characterized in terms of utility functions fM
and fW given by (1) and (2). Let 1 denote the vector of all ones on E. A 0–1 vector x on E is pairwise-stable in the
marriage model7 if and only if there exist 0–1 vectors zM and zW such that
1 = zM ∨ zW , (3)
x maximizes fM in {y ∈ ZE | yzM}, (4)
x maximizes fW in {y ∈ ZE | yzW }. (5)
This characterization can be interpreted as follows.We note that a 0–1 vector x satisfying (4) and (5) must be a matching
since x ∈ dom fM ∩ dom fW . For a matching x, condition (4) (resp. (5)) says that each man (resp. woman) selects one
of the best partners among partners in zM (resp. zW ). Therefore, (3) guarantees that there is no pair whose members
prefer each other to their partners in x or to being alone in x. Conversely, for a pairwise-stable matching x, zM can be
constructed as follows. Set zM(i, j) = 0 for all pairs (i, j) ∈ E such that i prefers j to his partner or to being alone
in x (note that by pairwise-stability of x, j does not prefer i to her partner or to being alone in x), and set zM(i, j) = 1
otherwise. Similarly, zW can be constructed from x. Then, (3)–(5) hold.
The assignment model allows side payments, which is not the case in the marriage model. An outcome is a triple
consisting of payoff vectors q = (qi : i ∈ M) ∈ RM , r = (rj : j ∈ W) ∈ RW , and a subset X ⊆ E, denoted by
(q, r;X). An outcome (q, r;X) is called pairwise-stable if
(a1) X is a matching,
(a2) qi + rj = aij + bij for all (i, j) ∈ X,
(a3) qi = 0 (resp. rj = 0) if i (resp. j) is unmatched in X,
(a4) q0, r0, and qi + rj aij + bij for all (i, j) ∈ E,
where 0 denotes a zero vector of an appropriate dimension and pij (=bij − rj = qi − aij ) means a side payment
from j to i for each (i, j) ∈ X. The pairwise-stability says that no pair (i, j) /∈X will be better off by forming a
partnership. Shapley and Shubik [28] proved the existence of a pairwise-stable outcome by linear programming duality
6 Here we consider weak pairwise-stability for a variation in which indifference is allowed. Note that strong pairwise-stability is deﬁned by the
conditions (m1)–(m3) [qi > aij or rj bij ] and [qi aij or rj > bij ] for all (i, j) ∈ E. A strongly pairwise-stable matching does not always exist
in our model, and hence, we restrict our attention to weak pairwise-stability.
7 We identify a subset X with its characteristic vector X .
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and integrality. The maximum weight bipartite matching problem with weights (aij + bij ) and its dual problem are
formulated as linear programs:
Maximize
∑
(i,j)∈E
(aij + bij )xij
subject to
∑
j∈W
xij 1 for all i ∈ M ,
∑
i∈M
xij 1 for all j ∈ W ,
xij 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E,
Minimize
∑
i∈M
qi +
∑
j∈W
rj
subject to qi + rj aij + bij for all (i, j) ∈ E,
qi0 for all i ∈ M ,
rj 0 for all j ∈ W .
Recall that the primal problem has an integral optimal solution, a matching. Thus, (q, r;X) is pairwise-stable if and
only if x = X, q and r are optimal solutions of the above dual problems, because (a1) and (a4) require primal and dual
feasibility and because (a2) and (a3) mean complementary slackness. Furthermore, pairwise-stability in the assignment
model can be characterized by using utility functions in (1) and (2). A 0–1 vector x on E is pairwise-stable8 if and
only if there exists p ∈ RE such that
x maximizes fM [+p], (6)
x maximizes fW [−p]. (7)
A pairwise-stable outcome (q, r;X) gives x = X together with p satisfying (6) and (7) by putting pij = bij − rj for
all (i, j) ∈ E. Conversely, x = X and p satisfying (6) and (7) lead us to a pairwise-stable outcome (q, r;X) such that
qi = aij + pij and rj = bij − pij for all (i, j) ∈ X and qi = 0 (resp. rj = 0) for all i (resp. j) unmatched in X.
3. Model description and the main theorem
Let M and W denote two disjoint sets of agents and E be a ﬁnite set. In our model, utilities (in monetary terms) of
M and W over E are, respectively, described by M-concave functions fM, fW : ZE → R ∪ {−∞}. In the exemplary
models described in Sections 2.2 and 4, E = M × W , and fM and fW can be regarded as aggregations of the utilities
of M-agents and W -agents (see Remark 3.4 given below). We assume that E is arbitrarily partitioned into two subsets
F (the set of ﬂexible elements) and R (the set of rigid elements).9 We also assume that fM and fW satisfy:
(A) Effective domains dom fM and dom fW are bounded and hereditary, and have 0 as a common minimum point,
where heredity means that 0x1x2 ∈ dom fM (resp. dom fW ) implies x1 ∈ dom fM (resp. dom fW ). Heredity
implies that each agent can arbitrarily decrease the multiplicity of partnerships he is in part of without permission from
his partners, similarly as in other two-sided matching market models.
Let z be an integral vector such that
dom fM ∪ dom fW ⊆ {y ∈ ZE | 0yz}.
8 A 0–1 vector x is pairwise-stable in the assignment model if and only if there exists a pairwise-stable outcome (q, r;X) with x = X .
9 In the Eriksson–Karlander model [6], M and W are, respectively, partitioned into {MF ,MR} and {WF ,WR}, and we have F = MF × WF
and R = E\F , where E = M × W .
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For a vector d onE and S ⊆ E, let d|S denote the restriction of d on S. Taking conditions (3)–(7) into account, we say that
x ∈ dom fM ∩ dom fW is an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (F,R), or simply fMfW -pairwise-stable
solution, if there exist p ∈ RE and zM, zW ∈ ZR such that
p|R = 0, (8)
z|R = zM ∨ zW , (9)
x ∈ arg max{fM [+p](y) | y|RzM}, (10)
x ∈ arg max{fW [−p](y) | y|RzW }. (11)
Condition (8) states that there are no side payments for rigid elements. Condition (9) replaces the upper bound vector
1 in (4) by z. Obviously, if E = R then our model includes the marriage model, and if E = F then it includes the
assignment model.
Before giving our main result, we give two illustrations of our model.
Example 3.1. We consider the problem of allocating dance partners between set M = {m1,m2} of two men and set
W = {w1, w2} of two women. Here, E = M × W . We assume that they have the following preferences:
• everyone wants to dance as many times as possible, up to four times,
• m1 prefers w1 to w2,
• w1 and w2 are indifferent for m2,
• every woman wants to dance with m1 and m2 as equally as possible.
Denoting by xij the number of times mi and wj dance together, we can describe their preferences by the following
four utility functions:
fm1(x11, x12) =
{
10x11 + 8x12 if 0x11 + x124,
−∞ otherwise,
fm2(x21, x22) =
{
10x21 + 10x22 if 0x21 + x224,
−∞ otherwise,
fw1(x11, x21) =
{
10x11 + 10x21 − (x211 + x221)/2 if 0x11 + x214,−∞ otherwise,
fw2(x12, x22) =
{
10x12 + 10x22 − (x212 + x222)/2 if 0x12 + x224,−∞ otherwise.
Then, the two aggregated utility functions fM = fm1 + fm2 and fW = fw1 + fw2 are concave functions deﬁned by the
laminar families
{{(1, 1)}, {(1, 2)}, {(2, 1)}, {(2, 2)}, {(1, 1), (1, 2)}, {(2, 1), (2, 2)}} and
{{(1, 1)}, {(1, 2)}, {(2, 1)}, {(2, 2)}, {(1, 1), (2, 1)}, {(1, 2), (2, 2)}},
respectively (see Example 2.2), and hence, are M-concave functions, where the pairs (mi, wj ) are abbreviated by
(i, j). Thus, the problem can be formulated by our model with F =∅. It is enough to set z= (4, 4, 4, 4). We have three
fMfW -pairwise-stable solutions x together with zM and zW as follows:
x = (x11, x12, x21, x22) zM zW
(4, 0, 0, 4) (4, 4, 4, 4) (4, 0, 0, 4)
(3, 1, 1, 3) (3, 4, 4, 4) (4, 1, 1, 4)
(2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 4, 4, 4) (4, 4, 4, 4)
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Example 3.2. We consider a problem similar to Example 3.1, except that pair (1, 2) is ﬂexible. Think of a situation
when m1 and w1 are professional and the others are amateur, and m2 and w1 are a married couple. A lesson fee is
allowed between a professional and an amateur, and a lesson fee between husband and wife is meaningless. Since there
exists a ﬂexible pair, utility functions must be represented precisely in monetary terms. We adopt the utility functions
of Example 3.1. Then, we have the following fMfW -pairwise-stable solutions x, together with p, zM , and zW :
x = (x11, x12, x21, x22) p zM zW
(3, 1, 1, 3) (0, , 0, 0) (3,−, 4, 4) (4,−, 1, 4)
(2, 2, 2, 2) (0, , 0, 0) (2,−, 4, 4) (4,−, 4, 2)
(1, 3, 3, 1) (0, 2, 0, 0) (4,−, 4, 4) (1,−, 4, 1)
(0, 4, 4, 0) (0, , 0, 0) (4,−, 4, 4) (0,−, 4, 0)
where 12, −12 and 26.5.
Our main result is the following theorem about the existence of an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution in our model.
Theorem 3.3 (Main theorem). For any M-concave functions fM, fW : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} satisfying (A) and for any
partition (F,R) of E, there exists an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (F,R).
A proof of the main theorem will be given in Section 5.
Remark 3.4. In our model, each of M and W is regarded as a single aggregate agent but can be interpreted as a set
of agents. Let M = {1, . . . , m}, W = {1, . . . , w}, and E = M × W . Also, deﬁne Ei = {i} × W for all i ∈ M , and
Ej =M ×{j} for all j ∈ W . Suppose that each agent i ∈ M has an M-concave utility function fi : ZEi → R∪{−∞}
on Ei , and that each agent j ∈ W has an M-concave utility function fj : ZEj → R ∪ {−∞} on Ej . Aggregations
fM(x) =∑i∈Mfi(x|Ei ) and fW(x) =∑j∈Wfj (x|Ej ) in x ∈ ZE are also M-concave. Moreover, E can arbitrarily
be partitioned into a set of ﬂexible pairs and a set of rigid pairs. It should be noted that this model is mathematically
equivalent to our model.
Remark 3.5. Our deﬁnition of an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution apparently depends on z. But it does not essentially
depend on z as long as z is large enough so that dom fM ∪ dom fW ⊆ {y ∈ ZE | 0yz}. One can see that x ∈
dom fM ∩ dom fW is an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (F,R) if and only if there exist p ∈ RE ,
disjoint subsets RM and RW of R, zM ∈ ZRM , and zW ∈ ZRW satisfying (8) and
x ∈ arg max{fM [+p](y) | y|RM zM},
x ∈ arg max{fW [−p](y) | y|RW zW }.
Remark 3.6. When M and W are, respectively, a set of workers and a set of ﬁrms, the coordinates of p can be
interpreted as salaries and hence p should be nonnegative. Although our model does not impose such a condition, the
nonnegativity of p can be derived as follows. Suppose that fW(x) denotes the total proﬁt of the ﬁrms obtained by
allocation x between workers and ﬁrms, and that dom fM is the set of allocations acceptable for workers and fM is
identically zero on dom fM . Then, for an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution x and for a ﬂexible element e with x(e)> 0,
we have p(e)0 because fM [+p](x)fM [+p](x − e) and fM(x) = fM(x − e) = 0.
Remark 3.7. When E = F , x ∈ dom fM ∩ dom fW is an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution if and only if there exists
p ∈ RE such that
x ∈ arg max fM [+p], (12)
x ∈ arg max fW [−p]. (13)
It is a direct consequence of the following theorem that the set of all fMfW -pairwise-stable solutions coincides with
the set of all maximizers of fM + fW (see also [20]).
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Theorem 3.8 (Murota [17]). ForM-concave functions f1, f2 : ZE → R∪{−∞} and a point x∗ ∈ dom f1∩dom f2,
we have x∗ ∈ arg max(f1 + f2) if and only if there exists p∗ ∈ RE such that x∗ ∈ arg max f1[+p∗] and x∗ ∈
arg max f2[−p∗]. Furthermore, for such a p∗, we have
arg max(f1 + f2) = arg max(f1[+p∗]) ∩ arg max(f2[−p∗]).
Since (A) guarantees that dom (fM + fW) is nonempty and bounded, fM + fW has a maximizer, which implies
the existence of an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (E,∅). We also give an algorithm for ﬁnding an
fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (E,∅) in Section 5.2.
4. Existing special models
The marriage model and the assignment model are special cases of our model as described in Section 2.2. In this
section we show that several extensions of these models are also special cases of ours.
4.1. Extensions of the marriage model
Fleiner [7] has generalized the marriage model to matroids. A tripleM= (E,I, >) is called an ordered matroid, if
I is the family of independent sets of a matroid on E and > is a linear order on E. An element e ∈ E is dominated by
X ⊆ E if e ∈ X or there exists Y ∈ I such that Y ⊆ X, {e} ∪ Y /∈I and e′ >e for all e′ ∈ Y . The set of elements
dominated by X is denoted by DM(X). Given two ordered matroidsMM = (E,IM,>M) andMW = (E,IW,>W),
X ⊆ E is called anMMMW -kernel if
(m4) X ∈ IM ∩IW and DMM (X) ∪ DMW (X) = E.
The marriage model (M,W, {aij }, {bij })without indifference can be formulated in the matroidal model. Let E be the
set of pairs (i, j) with aij , bij > 0. Also, deﬁne Ei = {(i, j) ∈ E | j ∈ W } for all i ∈ M , and Ej = {(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ M}
for all j ∈ W . It is known that
IM = {X ⊆ E | |X ∩ Ei |1 for all i ∈ M} and
IW = {X ⊆ E | |X ∩ Ej |1 for all j ∈ W }
are the families of independent sets of matroids. Then, X is a matching if and only ifX ∈ IM ∩IW . By deﬁning linear
orders >M and >W on E so that (i, j1)>M(i, j2) whenever aij1 >aij2 , and (i1, j)>W(i2, j) whenever bi1j > bi2j ,
a matching X is an MMMW -kernel if and only if for any pair (i, j) ∈ E\X there exists either (i, j ′) or (i′, j) in
X such that either (i, j ′)>M(i, j) or (i′, j)>W(i, j). Hence, the set of MMMW -kernels coincides with the set of
pairwise-stable matchings. The matroidal model can easily be modiﬁed so that indifference is allowed.
Eguchi and Fujishige [5] proposed a model based on M-concavity, which is a restriction of our model in which
E = R and dom fM , dom fW ⊆ {0, 1}E . We identify a subset of E with its characteristic vector. The above matroidal
model can be recognized as a special case of this model in which utility functions are linear. LetMM = (E,IM,>M)
andMW = (E,IW,>W) be an instance of the matroidal model. We describe linear orders >M and >W by positive
numbers {ae} and {be} such that ae′ >ae ⇐⇒ e′>Me and be′ >be ⇐⇒ e′>We, and deﬁne functions fM and fW by
fM(X) =
{ ∑
e∈X
ae if X ∈ IM,
−∞ otherwise, fW (X) =
{ ∑
e∈X
be if X ∈ IW,
−∞ otherwise, (14)
which are M-concave by Example 2.1. From basic theorems in matroid theory, we can show that a subset X of E is an
MMMW -kernel if and only if it is fMfW -pairwise-stable for the M-concave functions speciﬁed by (14).
Our model with E = R includes all of the above-mentioned models.
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4.2. Extensions of the assignment model
Sotomayor [32] proposed an extension of the assignment model in whichM andW denote sets of ﬁrms and workers,
respectively, and each ﬁrm i ∈ M has a quota of i (> 0) units of labor-time for hiring workers, and each worker j ∈ W
can supply at most j (> 0) units of time. Pair (i, j) can earn cij (=aij + bij ) per unit time. Instead of considering
matchings, let xij be the number of time units for which i hires j, and let x be called a labor allocation.A labor allocation
x ∈ ZM×W is called feasible if x0 and the following two inequalities hold:∑
j∈W
xij i for all i ∈ M , (15)
∑
i∈M
xij j for all j ∈ W . (16)
For any subsets M ′ ⊆ M and W ′ ⊆ W , let P(M ′,W ′) denote the maximum of∑i∈M ′∑j∈W ′cij xij over all feasible
labor allocations x. We call a pair (q, r) ∈ RM × RW a money allocation. Let q(M)=∑i∈Mqi and r(W)=∑j∈Wrj .
A money allocation (q, r) is feasible if q0, r0, and q(M) + r(W)P(M,W). It is in the core if it is feasible
and q(M ′) + r(W ′)P(M ′,W ′) for all coalitions M ′ ⊆ M and W ′ ⊆ W . She showed that an element of the core is
derived from a dual optimal solution of the transportation problem:
Maximize
∑
(i,j)∈E
cij xij
subject to (15), (16), x0,
which implies the nonemptiness of the core. Therefore, in our context, by deﬁning M-concave functions fM and
fW as
fM(x) =
{ ∑
(i,j)∈E
cij xij if x ∈ ZE satisﬁes (15) and x0,
−∞ otherwise,
fW(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ ZE satisﬁes (16) and x0,
−∞ otherwise,
an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution x, together with p, gives a money allocation (q, r) in the core. Such an allocation
(q, r) is deﬁned by
qi =
∑
j :xij>0
(cij + pij )xij for all i ∈ M ,
rj =
∑
i:xij>0
(−pij )xij for all j ∈ W .
However, the converse does not necessarily hold, as the core may strictly contain the set of dual optimal solutions (see
[32, Example 2]).
Kelso and Crawford [15] introduced a many-to-one labor market model in which the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm
satisﬁes gross substitutability and the utility function of each worker is strictly increasing (not necessarily linear) in
salary. Danilov et al. [4] provided, for the ﬁrst time, a model that is based on discrete convex analysis. Our model is
closely related to these models.
4.3. A hybrid model
Eriksson and Karlander [6] proposed a hybrid model of the marriage model and the assignment model. In this model,
agents are partitioned into two categories, called ﬂexible agents and rigid agents, that is, M and W are partitioned into
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(MF ,MR) and (WF ,WR), and F and R are deﬁned by
F = {(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ MF and j ∈ WF },
R = {(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ MR or j ∈ WR}.
A generalization of the hybrid model was also given by Sotomayor [31]. Here, we adopt the notion of pairwise-stability
of her generalized version. An outcome (q, r;X) is called pairwise-stable if
(h1) X is a matching,
(h2) qi + rj = aij + bij for all (i, j) ∈ X,
(h3) qi = aij > − ∞ and rj = bij > − ∞ for all (i, j) ∈ X ∩ R,
(h4) qi = 0 (resp. rj = 0) if i (resp. j) is unmatched in X,
(h5) q0, r0, and qi + rj aij + bij for all (i, j) ∈ F ,
(h6) qiaij or rj bij for all (i, j) ∈ R.
When E = R (resp. E = F ), conditions (h1)–(h6) are obviously equivalent to (m1)–(m3) (resp. (a1)–(a4)). As is seen
from the discussion in Section 2.2, our model includes this hybrid model as a special case.
5. Proof
In this section we prove our main theorem, Theorem 3.3.We give a constructive proof by combining two algorithms,
one for the marriage case and the other for the assignment case.We divide our arguments into three parts that deal with
(i) a variant of the marriage model,
(ii) a variant of the assignment model, and
(iii) a combination of the two.
Readers will easily understand the argument for the general model (iii) by ﬁrst understanding the algorithms for (i) and
(ii). The algorithm for (i) is interesting in its own right as it is a natural generalization of the Gale–Shapley algorithm
[11]. On the other hand, the other parts of our constructive proof are rather technical; for example, the algorithm for
(ii), called a successive shortest path algorithm, is a generalization of an algorithm for a network ﬂow problem.
5.1. The marriage case
For a given partition (F,R) we give an algorithm for ﬁnding xM, xW ∈ ZE and zM, zW ∈ ZR satisfying (9) and
xM ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|RzM}, (17)
xW ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RzW }, (18)
xM |R = xW |R . (19)
Here it should be noted that when (F,R) = (∅, E), conditions (9), (17)–(19) imply that xM(=xW ) is an fMfW -
pairwise-stable solution. Hence the algorithm proposed below can ﬁnd an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect
to (∅, E).
We ﬁrst state three fundamental lemmas, which hold without Assumption (A).
Lemma 5.1 (Murota [19]). Let f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} be an M-concave function and U be a nonempty subset of E.
Deﬁne the function f U : ZU → R ∪ {±∞} by
f U(x) = sup{f (y) | y ∈ ZE, y|U = x}
for each x ∈ ZU . If f U(x)< + ∞ for all x ∈ ZU , then f U is an M-concave function. In particular, if dom f is
bounded, then f U is M-concave.
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Lemma 5.2. 10 Let f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} be an M-concave function and z1, z2 ∈ ZE be such that z1z2,
arg max{f (y) | yz1} 
= ∅, and arg max{f (y) | yz2} 
= ∅.
(a) For any x1 ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}, there exists x2 such that
x2 ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2} and z2 ∧ x1x2.
(b) For any x2 ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2}, there exists x1 such that
x1 ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1} and z2 ∧ x1x2.
Proof. (a) Let x2 be a minimizer of
∑{x1(e)−x2(e) | e ∈ supp+((z2 ∧x1)−x2)} on arg max{f (y) | yz2}.We show
z2∧x1x2. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists e ∈ E with min{z2(e), x1(e)}>x2(e). Then e ∈ supp+(x1−x2).
By (M), there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x1 − x2) ∪ {0} with
f (x1) + f (x2)f (x1 − e + e′) + f (x2 + e − e′). (20)
If e′ 
= 0, then x1(e′)< x2(e′)z2(e′)z1(e′). Hence x1−e +e′z1, which implies f (x1)f (x1−e +e′). This,
together with (20), yields f (x2)f (x2 + e − e′). Moreover, since z2(e)> x2(e), we have x′2 = x2 + e − e′z2. It
follows that x′2 ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2} and x′2(e′) min{z2(e′), x1(e′)} if e′ 
= 0, which contradicts the minimality
of x2.
(b) Let x1 be a minimizer of
∑{x1(e) − x2(e) | e ∈ supp+((z2 ∧ x1) − x2)} on arg max{f (y) | yz1}. We show
z2∧x1x2. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists e ∈ E with min{z2(e), x1(e)}>x2(e). Then e ∈ supp+(x1−x2).
By (M), there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x1 − x2) ∪ {0} with
f (x1) + f (x2)f (x1 − e + e′) + f (x2 + e − e′). (21)
Since x2(e)< z2(e), we have x2 + e − e′z2, which implies f (x2)f (x2 + e − e′). This, together with (21),
yields f (x1)f (x1 − e + e′). Obviously x′1 = x1 − e + e′z1. However, this contradicts the minimality of x1
because x2(e′) min{z2(e′), x′1(e′)} if e′ 
= 0. 
Lemma 5.3. For anM-concave function f : ZE → R∪{−∞} and a vector z2 ∈ ZE suppose that arg max{f (y) | y
z2} 
= ∅. For any x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2} and any z1 ∈ ZE such that (i) z1z2 and (ii) if x(e) = z2(e) then
z1(e) = z2(e), we have x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the assertion is not satisﬁed. Let x′ be a point minimizing
∑{y(e) − z2(e) | e ∈
supp+(y−z2)} in y subject to yz1 and f (y)>f (x). By the assumption, there exists e ∈ E with x′(e)> z2(e)> x(e).
By (M) for x′, x, and e, there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x′ − x) ∪ {0} such that
f (x′) + f (x)f (x′ − e + e′) + f (x + e − e′).
Since x + e − e′z2, we have f (x)f (x + e − e′), which implies f (x′)f (x′ − e + e′). Obviously, x′ −
e + e′z1. However, this contradicts the minimality of x′ because if e′ 
= 0, then z2(e′)x(e′)> x′(e′). 
Our algorithm for ﬁnding xM, xW ∈ ZE and zM, zW ∈ ZR satisfying (9), (17)–(19) is a natural generalization of
the Gale–Shapley algorithm [11], which consists of proposal and rejection steps. Although we can deal with more
general cases, we illustrate our algorithm by considering a labor allocation model in which M and W are sets of ﬁrms
and workers. At each iteration, ﬁrms ﬁrst offer a labor allocation xM maximizing their aggregated utility fM under
the constraint xMzM , where zM((i, j)) represents ﬁrm i’s quota of time units for hiring worker j. This is a proposal
step. Next is a rejection step. Given the offer of ﬁrms, workers maximize the aggregated utility fW among possible
allocations less than or equal to xM . For workers’ choice xW and e = (i, j), if xW (e)< xM(e) then zM(e) is updated
10 This lemma says that C : dom f → 2dom f deﬁned by C(z) = arg max{f (y) | yz} satisﬁes “substitutability,” where 2dom f denotes the
set of all subsets of dom f . In fact, if dom f ⊆ {0, 1}E then statements (a) and (b) are equivalent to conditions of substitutability in Sotomayor
[29,Deﬁnition 4], and ifC always gives a singleton (in this case (a) and (b) are equivalent) then (a) and (b) are equivalent to persistence (substitutability)
in Alkan and Gale [1].
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as xW (e) because worker j does not supply more than xW (e) time units to ﬁrm i. Our algorithm iterates the above two
steps until xM = xW .
To describe our algorithm in more detail, we assume that we are initially given xM, xW ∈ ZE and zM, zW ∈ ZR
satisfying (9), (17) and the following:
xW ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RzW ∨ xM |R}, (22)
xW |RxM |R . (23)
We can easily compute these initial vectors by setting zM = z|R , zW = 0, and ﬁnding xM and xW such that
xM ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|RzM},
xW ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RxM |R}.
Here is our algorithm.
Algorithm G_GS (fM, fW , xM, xW , zM, zW )
Input: M-concave functions fM, fW and xM , xW , zM , zW satisfying (9), (17), (22), (23).
Step 1. Find xM ∈ arg max{fM(y) | xW |Ry|RzM}.
Step 2. Find xW ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RxM |R}.
Step 3. For each e ∈ R with xM(e)> xW(e), set zM(e) := xW (e), zW (e) := z(e).
Step 4. If xM |R = xW |R then output (xM, xW , zM, zW ∨ xM |R). Else go to Step 1.
From (A), xM and xW are well-deﬁned within the effective domains and G_GS terminates after at most
∑
e∈Rz(e)
iterations, because
∑
e∈RzM(e) strictly decreases at each iteration. In order to show that the outputs of G_GS satisfy
(9), (17)–(19), we establish two lemmas.
Let us assume that x(0)M , x
(0)
W , z
(0)
M , and z
(0)
W are the input vectors. Also let x
(i)
M , x
(i)
W , z
(i)
M , and z
(i)
W be obtained from
x
(i−1)
M , x
(i−1)
W , z
(i−1)
M , and z
(i−1)
W at the ith iteration in G_GS for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where the algorithm terminates at the
nth iteration.
Lemma 5.4. For all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, we have
x
(i+1)
M ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|Rz(i)M }. (24)
Proof. We prove (24) by induction on i. For i = 0, (24) holds by (17) and (23). We assume that for some l with
0 l < t , (24) holds for each i with 0 i l, and we show (24) for i = l+1. Since x(l+1)M ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|Rz(l)M }
and z(l)M z
(l+1)
M , Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2(a) guarantee the existence of x ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|Rz(l+1)M } with z(l+1)M ∧
x
(l+1)
M |Rx|R . By the modiﬁcation of zM , this implies (24) for i = l + 1 because z(l+1)M ∧ x(l+1)M |R = x(l+1)W |R . 
Lemma 5.5. For all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, we have
x
(i)
W ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|Rz(i)W ∨ x(i)M |R}. (25)
Proof. We show (25) by induction on i. For i = 0, (25) holds by (22). We assume that for some l with 0 l < t , (25)
holds for each i with 0 i l, and we show (25) for i = l + 1. By Lemmas 5.1, 5.2(b), and (25) for i = l, there exists x
such that
x ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|Rz(l)W ∨ (x(l)M |R) ∨ (x(l+1)M |R)}, (26)
(z
(l)
W ∨ x(l)M |R) ∧ x|Rx(l)W |R . (27)
On the other hand, by the deﬁnition of xM we have
x
(l)
W |Rx(l+1)M |R . (28)
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From (26)–(28), we have x|Rx(l+1)M |R and hence fW(x) = fW(x(l+1)W ). If z(l+1)W = z(l)W , then we immediately obtain
(25) for i = l + 1. So, we assume that z(l+1)W 
= z(l)W . By the modiﬁcation of zW , we have x(l+1)W (e)< x(l+1)M (e) if
z
(l)
W (e)< z
(l+1)
W (e). Hence it follows from Lemma 5.3 that (25) holds for i = l + 1. 
The correctness of G_GS follows from Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5.
Theorem 5.6. The outputs of G_GS satisfy (9), (17)–(19).
Proof. From Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 we have for i = n
x
(n)
M ∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|Rz(n)M },
x
(n)
W ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|Rz(n)W ∨ x(n)M |R},
x
(n)
M |R = x(n)W |R .
Because of the way in which we modiﬁed zM , zW , and xM , we have
z
(n)
M ∨ (z(n)W ∨ x(n)M |R) = z|R. 
The following is a by-product of Theorem 5.6.
Corollary 5.7. For any M-concave functions fM, fW : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} satisfying (A), there exists an fMfW -
pairwise-stable solution with respect to (∅, E).
5.2. The assignment case
In this subsection we explain a successive shortest path algorithm (SSP) for ﬁnding a maximizer of fM + fW . It is
a modiﬁed version of an algorithm given by Moriguchi and Murota [16]. As discussed in Remark 3.7, when F = E, a
maximizer of fM + fW gives an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (E,∅). We recall that SSP is used as
a basic procedure for ﬁnding an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution for our general case.
Before describing SSP, we state several known results on M-concave functions. Let y(E) =∑e∈Ey(e) for all
y ∈ ZE . For an M-concave function f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞}, we deﬁne fˆ : Z{0}∪E → R ∪ {−∞} by
fˆ (y0, y) =
{
f (y) if y0 = −y(E),
−∞ otherwise
for all (y0, y) ∈ Z{0}∪E . Function fˆ is called anM-concave function and can be characterized by the following exchange
property11 [17,18]:
(M) for all x, y ∈ dom fˆ and all e ∈ supp+(x − y), there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x − y) such that
fˆ (x) + fˆ (y) fˆ (x − e + e′) + fˆ (y + e − e′).
In particular, an M-concave function is also M-concave. We denote {0} ∪ E by Eˆ. For a vector x ∈ RE we denote by
xˆ the vector (−x(E), x) ∈ REˆ . For a vector p˜ = (p0, p) ∈ REˆ ,
x ∈ arg max f [p − p01] ⇐⇒ xˆ ∈ arg max fˆ [p˜]. (29)
Thus, the problem of ﬁnding an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (E,∅) is equivalent to that of ﬁnding
a maximizer of fˆM + fˆW .
The maximizers of an M-concave function have a useful characterization.12
11 (M) is written as (−M-EXC) in [20].
12 The sum of two M-concave functions is not M-concave in general. So we need a sophisticated characterization for the maximizers of the sum
of two M-concave functions (see Theorem 3.8).
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Theorem 5.8 (Murota [17,18]). For any M-concave function fˆ : ZEˆ → R ∪ {−∞} and x ∈ dom fˆ , x ∈ arg max fˆ
if and only if fˆ (x) fˆ (x − e + e′) for all e, e′ ∈ Eˆ.
The following property is a direct consequence of property (M).
Lemma 5.9. For anyM-concave function fˆ , arg max fˆ satisﬁes: for any x, y ∈ arg max fˆ and any e ∈ supp+(x−y),
there exists e′ ∈ supp−(x − y) such that x − e + e′ , y + e − e′ ∈ arg max fˆ .
A set B of integral vectors satisfying the property in Lemma 5.9 is called an M-convex set. M-convex sets have the
following property:
Lemma 5.10 (Fujishige [9, Lemma 4.5]). Let B be an M-convex set. For any x ∈ B and any distinct e1, e′1, e2,
e′2, . . . , er , e′r ∈ Eˆ, if x − ei + e′i ∈ B for all i = 1, . . . , r and x − ei + e′j /∈B for all i, j with i < j , then
y = x −∑ri=1 (ei − e′i ) ∈ B.
Now, we return to explaining SSP. Let xˆM and xˆW be arbitrary maximizers of fˆM and fˆW , respectively.We construct
a directed graph G = (Eˆ, A) and an arc length  ∈ RA as follows. Arc set A has two disjoint parts:
AM = {(e, e′) | e, e′ ∈ Eˆ, e 
= e′, xˆM − e + e′ ∈ dom fˆM},
AW = {(e′, e) | e, e′ ∈ Eˆ, e 
= e′, xˆW − e + e′ ∈ dom fˆW }, (30)
and  ∈ RA is deﬁned by
(a) =
{
fˆM(xˆM) − fˆM(xˆM − e + e′) if a = (e, e′) ∈ AM,
fˆW (xˆW ) − fˆW (xˆW − e + e′) if a = (e′, e) ∈ AW. (31)
The length function  is nonnegative due to Theorem 5.8.
For a set S of speciﬁed source vertices of Eˆ, let d : Eˆ → R ∪ {+∞} denote the shortest distances from S to all
vertices in G with respect to . Then, for all arcs a = (e, e′) ∈ A
(a) + d(e) − d(e′)0.
Let t be an arbitrary vertex of Eˆ reachable from S, and deﬁne p˜ ∈ REˆ by p˜(e) = min{d(e), d(t)} for all e ∈ Eˆ. It
follows from the nonnegativity of  that for all arcs a = (e, e′) ∈ A
(a) + p˜(e) − p˜(e′)0.
The above system of inequalities is equivalent to
fˆM(xˆM) − fˆM(xˆM − e + e′) + p˜(e) − p˜(e′)0,
fˆW (xˆW ) − fˆW (xˆW − e + e′) − p˜(e) + p˜(e′)0
for all e, e′ ∈ Eˆ, which is further equivalent to
xˆM ∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜], xˆW ∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜],
by Theorem 5.8. Note that for each arc a = (e, e′) ∈ A, p˜(a) = (a) + p˜(e) − p˜(e′) is the length of a in the directed
graph deﬁned in the same way as above for fˆM [+p˜], fˆW [−p˜], xˆM , and xˆW . Also note that p˜(a) = 0 for all arcs a in
a shortest path from S to t.
Let P be a shortest path from S to t in G with the minimum number of arcs. Since p˜(a) = 0 for all a ∈ P ,
xˆM − e + e′ ∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜] for all (e, e′) ∈ P ∩ AM ,
xˆW − e + e′ ∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜] for all (e′, e) ∈ P ∩ AW . (32)
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Since P has the minimum number of arcs,
xˆM − e + e′′ /∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜], xˆW − e′′ + e /∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜] (33)
for all vertices e and e′′ of P such that (e, e′′) /∈P and e appears earlier than e′′ in P. Furthermore, arcs of AM and
AW appear alternately in P. For otherwise, assume that two consecutive arcs (e, e′), (e′, e′′) ∈ P belong to AM . Then,
by (M)
fˆM(xˆM + e − e′) + fˆM(xˆM + e′ − e′′) fˆM(xˆM) + fˆM(xˆM + e − e′′),
which yields
(e, e′) + (e′, e′′)(e, e′′),
a contradiction to the minimality (with respect to the number of arcs) of P. Consequently,
a1 = (e1, e′1), a2 = (e2, e′2) ∈ P ∩ AM, a1 
= a2 ⇒ {e1, e′1} ∩ {e2, e′2} = ∅,
a1 = (e1, e′1), a2 = (e2, e′2) ∈ P ∩ AW, a1 
= a2 ⇒ {e1, e′1} ∩ {e2, e′2} = ∅. (34)
From Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10 together with (32)–(34), we have
xˆ′M ≡ xˆM −
∑
(e,e′)∈P∩AM
(e − e′) ∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜], (35)
xˆ′W ≡ xˆW −
∑
(e′,e)∈P∩AW
(e − e′) ∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜]. (36)
Conditions (35) and (36) guarantee that if S = supp+(xˆM − xˆW ) and t ∈ supp−(xˆM − xˆW ), then we can decrease the
distance between new maximizers xˆ′M and xˆ′W by modifying p˜ as above.
The above discussion leads us to Algorithm SSP for ﬁnding a maximizer of fˆM + fˆW described as follows.
Algorithm SSP
Step 0. Find xˆM ∈ arg max fˆM and xˆW ∈ arg max fˆW . Set p˜ := 0.
Step 1. If xˆM = xˆW then stop.
Step 2. Construct G and compute  for fˆM [+p˜], fˆW [−p˜], xˆM and xˆW by (30) and (31). Set S := supp+(xˆM − xˆW ),
T := supp−(xˆM − xˆW ).
Step 3. Compute the shortest distances d(e) from S to all e ∈ Eˆ in G with respect to . Find a shortest path P from S to
T with the minimum number of arcs.
Step 4. For each e ∈ Eˆ, set p˜(e) := p˜(e) + min{d(e),∑a∈P (a)}. Update xˆM and xˆW by (35) and (36). Go to Step 1.
Under (A), a shortest pathP in Step 3 always exists because if there is no path from supp+(xˆM−xˆW ) to supp−(xˆM−xˆW ),
then dom fˆM ∩ dom fˆW must be empty (see [20]). By (35) and (36), the algorithm preserves
xˆM ∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜], xˆW ∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜].
Hence, if SSP terminates, then it ﬁnds a maximizer of fˆM + fˆW . SinceP is a path from supp+(xˆM − xˆW ) to supp−(xˆM −
xˆW ), and arcs of AM and AW appear alternately in P,
∑
e∈Eˆ |xˆM(e)− xˆW (e)| decreases by two after each execution of
Step 4, which guarantees the termination of SSP.
When E = F , as we see from the above discussion, we can relax (A) to the requirement that dom fM ∩ dom fW is
nonempty and bounded.
Corollary 5.11. For any M-concave functions fM, fW : ZE → R∪{−∞} such that dom fM ∩dom fW is nonempty
and bounded, there exists an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution with respect to (E,∅).
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Fig. 2. An outline of Phase 1 consisting of G_GS and SSP: the equation numbers correspond to those in the text.
Remark 5.12. In Step 4 of SSP, we can update p˜ as: for each e ∈ Eˆ,
p˜(e) := p˜(e) + min
{
d(e),
∑
a∈P
(a)
}
−
∑
a∈P
(a)
while preserving xˆM ∈ arg max fˆM [+p˜] and xˆW ∈ arg max fˆW [−p˜]. The subtraction of a constant does not affect the
correctness of SSP since xˆM(Eˆ) = xˆW (Eˆ) = 0. This modiﬁed version will be used in our algorithm in Section 5.3.
5.3. The general case
In this subsection, we give an algorithm for ﬁnding an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution for the general case, that is,
an algorithm for ﬁnding xM, xW ∈ ZE , p ∈ RE and zM, zW ∈ ZR satisfying
p|R = 0, (37)
z|R = zM ∨ zW , (38)
xM ∈ arg max{fM [+p](y) | y|RzM}, (39)
xW ∈ arg max{fW [−p](y) | y|RzW }, (40)
xM = xW . (41)
The algorithm has the following two phases:
(i) Phase 1 ﬁnds xM, xW ∈ ZE , p ∈ RE , and zM, zW ∈ ZR satisfying (37)–(40), and the following conditions:
xM |R = xW |R , (42)
xMxW . (43)
Note that if we further get (41), then x(=xM = xW ) is an fMfW -pairwise-stable solution. Phase 1 relies on two
algorithms, G_GS and SSP described in the previous subsections (see Fig. 2).
(ii) Phase 2 executes part of Phase 1 with the inputs obtained from the outputs of Phase 1 by interchanging the roles
of M and W . The outputs of Phase 2 satisfy (37)–(41).
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Before giving the details of Phase 1, we show a basic property of an M-concave function.
Lemma 5.13. Let f : ZE → R ∪ {−∞} be an M-concave function. For an element e ∈ E, let z1, z2 ∈ ZE be such
that z1 = z2 + e, arg max{f (y) | yz1} 
= ∅, and arg max{f (y)|yz2} 
= ∅. Then, the following two statements
hold:
(a) For any x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}, there exists e′ ∈ {0} ∪ E such that
x − e + e′ ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2}.
(b) For any x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2}, there exists e′ ∈ {0} ∪ E such that
x + e − e′ ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}.
Proof. (a) If xz2, then it sufﬁces to set e′ = e. Hence, we assume that x(e)= z1(e)= z2(e)+1. Let x′ be any element
of arg max{f (y) | yz2}. By (M) for x, x′, and e, there exists e′ ∈ {0} ∪ supp−(x − x′) such that
f (x) + f (x′)f (x − e + e′) + f (x′ + e − e′).
Since x′ + e − e′z1 and x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}, the above inequality implies f (x′)f (x − e + e′), that is,
x − e + e′ ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2}.
(b) If x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}, then it sufﬁces to set e′ = e. Hence we assume that x /∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1}.
Then there exists x′ ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz1} with x′(e) = z1(e), and by (M) for x′, x, and e, there exists e′ ∈
{0} ∪ supp−(x′ − x) such that
f (x′) + f (x)f (x′ − e + e′) + f (x + e − e′).
Since x′ − e + e′z2 and x ∈ arg max{f (y) | yz2}, we have f (x′)f (x + e − e′), that is, x + e − e′ ∈
arg max{f (y) | yz1}. 
We next give the procedure for Phase 1, where f zMM and f
zW
W are M

-concave functions deﬁned by
f
zM
M (x) =
{
fM(x) if x|RzM,
−∞ otherwise,
f
zW
W (x) =
{
fW(x) if x|RzW ,
−∞ otherwise.
Phase 1
Step 0. Set zM := z|R , zW :=0, p:=0. Find xM∈ arg max{fM(y) | y|RzM} and xW ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RxM |R}.
Step 1. Set (xM, xW , zM, zW ) := G_GS(fM [+p], fW [−p], xM, xW , zM, zW ).
Step 2. If xMxW , then output (xM, xW , p, zM, zW ) and Phase 1 terminates.
Step 3. Construct G and compute  for fˆ zMM [+(0, p)], fˆ zWW [−(0, p)], xˆM , xˆW by (30) and (31). Set S := supp+(xM −
xW ), T := {0} ∪ R ∪ supp−(xM − xW ).
Step 4. Compute the shortest distances d(e) from S to all e ∈ Eˆ in G with respect to . Find a shortest path P from S to
T with a minimum number of arcs.
Step 5. For all e ∈ Eˆ, set p˜(e) := p˜(e)+min{d(e), (P )} − (P ), where p˜ = (p0, p) and (P )=∑a∈P (a). Update
xˆM and xˆW by (35) and (36).
Step 6. If the terminal vertex e of P is in R and the last arc a of P is in AM , then choose e′ ∈ {0} ∪ E such that
xW + e − e′ ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RzW ∨ xM |R}, and set xW := xW + e − e′ . Go to Step 1.
Before analyzing Phase 1 in detail, we give several remarks. Steps 3–5 are the same asAlgorithm SSP except for the
deﬁnitions of S, T, and p˜. In order to achieve p|R = 0 and p0 = 0 as required by (37) and (29), we have modiﬁed the
way of updating S, T, and p˜ in original SSP. As we will show later, (42) is satisﬁed just before Step 3, and hence S and
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T are disjoint. By (A), there exist arcs from all e ∈ supp+(xM − xW ) to 0 in G, which guarantees the existence of a
path from S to T. In Step 6 we can choose e′ ∈ {0} ∪E such that xW + e − e′ ∈ arg max{fW(y) | y|RzW ∨ xM |R},
due to Lemma 5.13(b), as will be shown later.
It is a direct consequence of the next lemma that (37)–(40), (42), and (43) hold at the termination of Phase 1:
Lemma 5.14. The following three statements hold for Phase 1:
(a) Just after Step 0,
xW ∈ arg max{fW [−p](y) | y|RzW ∨ xM |R}, (44)
xW |RxM |R , (45)
and (37)–(39) hold.
(b) Just after Step 1, (37)–(40) and (42) hold.
(c) Just after Step 6, (37)–(39), (44) and (45) hold.
Proof. Assertion (a) holds trivially. We will prove (b) and (c) by induction on the number of iterations from Steps
1 through 6. We assume that (b) and (c) hold at the lth iteration, and we show that these statements also hold at the
(l + 1)st iteration.
(b) By either (a) or (c) for the lth iteration, (37)–(39), (44) and (45) hold just before Step 1. From the argument
in Section 5.1, G_GS outputs xM , xW , zM and zW satisfying (38)–(40) and (42). On the other hand, (37) is satisﬁed
because p is not changed by G_GS.
(c) By (b), we have (37)–(40) and (42) just before Step 3. As Steps 3–6 change neither zM nor zW , (38) holds just
after Step 6. By the argument in Section 5.2 (see also Remark 5.12) and the deﬁnitions of f zMM and f zWW , Lemmas 5.9
and 5.10 imply that (39) and (40) hold just after Step 5. Since {0} ∪R ⊆ T , the shortest distances from S to vertices in
{0} ∪ R are greater than or equal to (P ), and hence (p0, p) updated in Step 5 satisﬁes (37) and p0 = 0. To show (44)
and (45), we consider three cases: (i) the terminal vertex e of P is in T \R, (ii) e ∈ R and the last arc a of P is in AW ,
and (iii) e ∈ R and the last arc a of P is in AM . In case (i), (42) holds just after Step 5, and hence xM |RzW holds.
This and (40) imply (44). In cases (ii) and (iii), just after Step 5 we have xM(e) = xW (e) + 1 and xM(e′′) = xW (e′′)
for all e′′ ∈ R\{e}, and hence (45). Furthermore, in case (ii), because xM |R was not changed in Step 5, (b) implies that
xM |RzW just after Step 6. This, together with (40), implies (44). In case (iii), because xM(e) was increased by one in
Step 5, (44) may not hold just before Step 6. However, Lemma 5.13(b) guarantees that xW updated in Step 6 satisﬁes
(44) and (45). 
We next show that Phase 1 terminates in a ﬁnite number of iterations. To show this, we state a lemma.
Lemma 5.15. IfG_GS has inputs satisfying (42) in Phase 1, then it can terminate by simply setting zW := zW ∨xM |R .
Proof. By (a) and (c) of Lemma 5.14, the inputs xM , xW , zM of G_GS, and zW modiﬁed as above satisfy (38)–(40)
and (42). 
In the sequel we assume that G_GS in Phase 1 is executed as shown in Lemma 5.15. Then we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.16. Phase 1 terminates in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Proof. We ﬁrst observe that Step 1 with xM |R 
= xW |R is executed ﬁnitely many times. Let e and e′ be the elements
deﬁned in the previous Step 6. By the discussion in Section 5.1, if G_GS has inputs with xM |R 
= xW |R , then either
zM(e) or zM(e
′) is decreased by at least one. Since Steps 2–6 preserve zM and zW , and since Step 1 does not increase
zM , Step 1 with xM |R 
= xW |R is executed ﬁnitely many times, due to (A).
We next observe that the cycle of Steps 1–6 in which (42) (i.e., xM |R = xW |R) is retained is executed consecutively
ﬁnitely many times, by showing that either  =∑{xM(e′′) − xW (e′′)|e′′ ∈ supp+(xM − xW )} is decreased by one or
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=∑{xM(e′′) | e′′ ∈ R} is increased by one at each iteration. Let e, e′ and a be the elements deﬁned in Step 6. If (42)
holds just after Step 6, then we have one of the following two cases: (i) e ∈ T \R, (ii) e ∈ R, a ∈ AM and e′ ∈ Eˆ\R.
We ﬁrst assume that either case (i) or the subcase of (ii) where e′ ∈ T \R occurs.As we assumed on the basis of Lemma
5.15, Step 1 with (42) changes neither xM nor xW . Lemma 5.14(b) yields that S ∩ T = ∅. Since there always exists a
path from S to T, an execution of Steps 3–5 reduces  by one. Furthermore, Step 6 does not increase . We next assume
that the other subcase of (ii) where e′ ∈ E\T occurs. In this case, an execution of Steps 3–5 decreases  by one and
Step 6 increases  by one, and hence  remains the same. However,  is increased by one. Thus, the cycle of Steps 1–6
preserving (42) is executed consecutively ﬁnitely many times, due to (A).
Hence, Phase 1 terminates in a ﬁnite number of iterations. 
Before explaining Phase 2, we state a lemma.
Lemma 5.17. Phase 1 can be executed so that it preserves
xMxW (46)
once this relation holds.
Proof. We assume that (46) holds in some iteration of Phase 1. If (46) holds just before Step 3, the inequality is
preserved by the execution of Steps 3–5 because T = {0} ∪ R. Obviously, the modiﬁcation of xW in Step 6 does not
destroy (46). It remains to show that (46) can be kept while executing G_GS. Without loss of generality, we assume
that xM |R 
= xW |R at the beginning of G_GS. Then, xM(e1) = xW (e1) + 1 for some e1 ∈ R and xM(e2) = xW (e2) for
all e2 ∈ R\{e1}. In G_GS, we can apply Lemma 5.13(a) to update xM and Lemma 5.13(b) to update xW , respectively.
Hence, at the end of the lth iteration (but not the ﬁnal one) of G_GS, we have for some e ∈ R and for all e′′ ∈ R\{e}
x
(l)
M (e) = x(l)W (e) + 1, x(l)M (e′′) = x(l)W (e′′).
Moreover, G_GS terminates when e′ ∈ {0} ∪F for e′ in Lemma 5.13. If e′ ∈ F , then either xM(e′) is increased by one
or xW (e
′) is decreased by one. Hence, relation (46) is preserved by G_GS. 
Let (x′M, x′W, p′, z′M, z′W) be the outputs of Phase 1. Phase 2 is the same as Phase 1 except that it starts from Step
2 with the inputs (x′W, x′M,p′, z′W, z′M), namely, the roles of M and W are interchanged in Phase 2. Since x′W x′M
holds, Lemma 5.17 says that Phase 2 preserves this relation. Lemmas 5.14 and 5.16 guarantee that Phase 2 terminates
in a ﬁnite number of iterations and outputs xM , xW , p, zM , and zW satisfying (37)–(41). We have thus shown our main
result, Theorem 3.3.
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